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WILLIAM H. EDDY, JR."

Mind Over Matter: The Coming
Revolution in the Natural Sciences
What I would like to do despite the strictures of time and the
complexity of the subject matter is to describe briefly a revolution in
thought that I believe is taking place today in various segments of the
scientific community. I also believe that it is a characteristic of such
revolutions that they remain virtually unrecognized by the mainstream
thinking of the very communities in which they are occurring. This is an
illustration of what I call the First Corollary of Environmental
Perception, which states that "it is impossible to perceive any environment except from the context of another." It is especially true in many
universities, where the habits and traditions of thought, though different
perhaps from those of the past, are almost as deeply entrenched today as
they were in, say, the universities of medieval Europe. Thus, the First
Corollary of Environmental Perception applies not simply to physical
environments but to environments of thought as well. It perhaps helps to
explain why historians today can speak so easily of a period called the
Middle Ages while people living at the time could not.
Because I believe we are in the midst of a revolution in thought, I
think it appropriate to begin my comments with two short quotes from
Thomas Kuhn, who, as many of you will know, was at the time of his
death Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy at MIT.
In 1962 Kuhn wrote what has become a classic on the changes in
scientific thought entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I find it
remarkable that so many of the people to whom it is addressed are
unfamiliar with it. First published in 1962 as part of The International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, it was reissued in a separate edition in
1970 and, it is from this latter edition that I quote. Kuhn says:
Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing
sense, often restricted to a segment of the political
community, that existing institutions have ceased
adequately to meet the problems posed by an
environment that they have in part created. In much the
same way, scientific revolutions are inaugurated by a
growing sense, again restricted to a narrow subdivision
of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm
has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of
*
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an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had
previously led the way.'
And then again he states:
Normal science, the activity in which most scientists
inevitably spend almost all their time, is predicated on the
assumption that the scientific community knows what the
world is like. Much of the success of the enterprise derives
from the community's willingness to defend that assumption, if necessary at considerable cost. Normal science, for
example, often suppresses fundamental novelties because
they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments. 2
On the sixth of December of 1993, a short essay appeared on the
editorial page of the Wall Street Journal. It was written by Stephen Meyer,
a professor of history and the philosophy of science at Whitworth
College in Spokane, Washington. Meyer describes events that took place
in the fall of 1992 at San Francisco State University when a professor of
biology by the name of Dean Kenyon was prohibited by his department
chairman from teaching courses in introductory biology.
Professor Kenyon, who holds a Ph.D. in biophysics from
Stanford University, is described by Stephen Meyer as "an authority on
chemical evolutionary theory." In a book he co-authored in 1969 entitled
Biochemical Predestination, Professor Kenyon explained the process by
which living cells might have emerged from the chemicals present on the
early earth. Since then, Kenyon's research has led him to conclude that
no such evolution could have taken place without the "guidance" of
some form of "intelligence." In short, he has come to believe that
something like "mind" had a role in shaping life. The chairman of the
biology department removed Kenyon from any further involvement in
the classroom because he said that Kenyon was teaching "religion."
Stephen Meyer in his essay comments, "The simplistic labeling
of Mr. Kenyon's statements as 'religion' and the strictly materialistic
view as 'scientific,' seems entirely unwarranted. Biology texts," he
continues, "routinely recapitulate Darwinian arguments against
intelligent design. Yet if arguments against intelligent design are
philosophically neutral and strictly scientific, why are Mr. Kenyon's
arguments for intelligent design inherently unscientific and religiously
charged?"
1.

1970).
2.

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (2nd ed.

Id. at5.
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In the December 15, 1993, edition of the Wall Street Journal, all
the letters to the editor took part in the debate. Letters appeared again in
the editions for January and February. There were probably other letters
I did not see. The debate was waged with an intensity that reminded me
of that time early in the history of medieval universities when professors
were required to sign an oath that they would teach nothing that was
contrary to the writings of that greatest of dead authorities, Aristotle,
who, as you will remember, had lived 1700 years earlier.
To more fully understand something of the origins of the debate
created by Meyer's essay, I would like to take a circuitous but, I believe,
necessary journey back to the time of another revolution in thought and
to the debates by which that revolution was defined. I am speaking of
what has been called the Copernican Revolution and the subsequent trial
of Galileo in 1633.
Nicholas Copernicus died in 1543. Historians tell us that friends
placed into his hands before his death a copy of his newly printed book
on the universe-De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium [On the Revolution
of Heavenly Bodies 11.In it he described his hypothesis that the earth along
with the other planets revolved around the sun. He had waited 30 years
to publish his ideas and only did so toward the very end at the urging of
two powerful members of the Catholic Church, his old friend Canon
Tiedemann Giese of Frauenburg in East Prussia and Nicholas
Schoenberg, Cardinal of Capua and the confidante of Pope Paul III, to
whom Copernicus had dedicated his book.
So here was the Catholic Church urging Copernicus to publish
his hypothesis, and yet 90 years later the Church would force the nearly
70-year-old Galileo, under threat of torture, to abjure his support of the
Copernican hypothesis, and they would then place him under house
arrest for the remaining nine years of his life. How could such an
apparent reversal in the Church's position have taken place? I would
suggest that in the answer to that question lies the real meaning behind
what we call the Scientific Revolution.
Prior to Copernicus, the model of the universe that had
dominated European thought for more than 1400 years was the one
described by the Greco-Egyptian astronomer and geographer Ptolemy,
who lived and wrote in Alexandria, Egypt, in the second century A.D. In
his 13-volume work known as the Almagest, he described a universe at
the center of which the round Earth stood motionless, while orbiting it in
concentric crystalline spheres were the seven known planets, including
the sun and the moon. Surrounding them was an eighth sphere
containing all the fixed stars, and surrounding that an invisible sphere
called the Primum Mobile, or First Mover. It was a remarkably ordered
and harmonious universe consisting of a satisfying compendium of

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Pythagorean, Aristotelian, and Christian thinking. I am assuming that its
structure is familiar enough not to need further detail, as the issue that is
most important to us here is whether people living in the Middle Ages
believed that this was actually the way the universe was.
Undoubtedly for many people, if they thought about it at all,
some basic elements of the Ptolemaic universe formed a real but hazy
and ill-defined part of the fabric of their mental environment -almost
like the wallpaper in the room of a house in which we once lived as
children. Just as then, there are people today who, if asked, might say
they visualize the atom as a miniature solar system with a sun-like
atomic nucleus orbited by planet-like electrons. This metaphor for
describing what cannot be seen was first suggested by quantum
physicist Neils Bohr in 1913. While taken literally by some, perhaps, it is
clearly understood by the established scientific community as a
convenient fiction for what is impossible to visualize.
In the same way, the medieval establishment, made up of
Church and university, would have treated Ptolemy's thinking as
hypothesis only -as a convenient model for "saving the appearances of
the celestial phenomena," as they would have expressed it then. We find
this a difficult idea to understand today because for us to see the
universe through medieval eyes requires us to interpret the data very
differently than we are used to doing. The Church's premise would have
been that God could cause things to happen in the universe in any way
He chose, and this would include ways beyond human comprehension.
Humans might see the effects of those causes but they could never know
for certain what brought them about. Thus, early cosmographers were
limited to speculations called hypotheses. They were tools that explained
how nature appeared to work, but no thoughtful person confused them
with the truth. And the Church made certain that was very clear.
And so it was in precisely this same light that the Church urged
Copernicus to make public his hypothesis. From what the Church knew
of the Copernican model before it appeared in print, it was simpler than
Ptolemy's model in the number of variables needed to explain planetary
motion, and it was also understood to be more accurate in predicting
those motions. This latter capability, as applied to the motions of the sun
and moon, was, of course, crucial to the Church for fixing the date of
Easter on which so many other dates in the Christian calendar depended.
Galileo turned all of this inside out, but not because, as most of
us learned in school, he introduced a revolutionary view of the universe
that contradicted the Church's rigid commitment to the Ptolemaic view.
His threat was of an entirely different order. What Galileo was saying by
implication about Copernicus was that if an hypothesis "saves all the
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appearances," then it is the same as the truth. It is no longer just a model.
It is a description of the way things really are.
The English literary scholar C.S. Lewis describes the significance
of this idea in his book The DiscardedImage. He speaks of Galileo's impact
this way:
The real reason why Copernicus raised no ripple and
Galileo raised a storm may well be that whereas the one
offered a new supposal about celestial motions, the other
insisted on treating this supposal as fact. If so the real
the heavens but
revolution consisted not in a new theory of
3
theory."
of
nature
the
of
theory
in a "new
It seems to me that Galileo's idea was strikingly similar to one
expressed by Martin Luther a hundred years earlier when Luther argued
that the individual human being could seek salvation directly through
his own experience of God without the intermediary of the Church or its
representatives. Galileo was saying that, if an individual through his
own sense experience could develop a hypothesis that explained how
everything appeared to the senses, then that would be the same as the
truth. And there would be no need for the Church to explain the
phenomena in its own terms. In both instances, the Church perceived its
authority to be at bay and fought back with all the considerable power it
possessed.
But Galileo did much more than validate our reasoned sense
experience as a map of reality. He changed the very way that people
from that time onward would think about the physical world.
In 1623, Galileo published a book called The Assayer or, in
Italian, II Saggiatore. It was a scathing and completely unfair attack on a
work about comets by a prominent Jesuit astronomer named Horatio
Grassi. It represented the beginning of Galileo's downfall, a downfall
brought about to large degree by his own intractable arrogance. It is in
The Assayer, however, that Galileo makes two statements that were to
form the foundation for all future scientific thought. This is the first one:
"Philosophy [natural science]," he wrote, "is written in that
vast book that stands forever open before our eyes, I mean
the universe; but it cannot be read until we have learnt the
language and become familiar with the characters within
which it is written. It is written in mathematical language,
and the letters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical

3. C.S. LEWIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE 16 (1964).
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figures, without such means it is humanly impossible to
4
comprehend a single word."
R.G. Collingwood, the brilliant English polymath who was
Wayneflete professor of philosophy at Oxford University and who died
in 1943, commented on this statement by Galileo in his marvelous little
book entitled The Idea of Nature. Collingwood says,
With Galileo the modem science of nature reaches
maturity. It was he who first laid down clearly and finally
the terms on which nature could be an object of adequate
and certain scientific knowledge. In a word, these terms
were the exclusion of everything qualitative and the
restriction of natural reality to a complex of
quantities .... The principle of science as understood by
Galileo is that nothing is scientifically knowable except
5
what is measurable.
The second foundation stone in the edifice of modern science
that was laid by Galileo was the distinction he drew between the
observer and the object of observation. As far as I know, he was the first
person in Western science to have made such a distinction. He wrote that
all objects have two sets of qualities, which he labeled primary and
secondary. Primary qualities are those that are inherent in the object
itself and, thus, exist independently of any observer. They include such
qualities as motion, figure (or shape), extension in space (length, breadth,
and width), solidity, and number. The secondary qualities are such
things as color, sound, taste, and smell, as well beauty and ugliness.
These are qualities that exist only in the senses and mind of the observer.
In The Assayer he states,
I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed,
shapes and numbers and motions would remain, but not
odor or tastes or sounds. The latter, I believe, are nothing
more than names when separated from living things. 6
In these words we can see the beginning of that objectification of
nature that came to characterize scientific thought between the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. This polarization of nature into
the observer and the observed led to a world that now had both an
4. GALILEO GALILE, II SAGGIATORE; as quoted in R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF
NATURE 102 (1960).
5. R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF NATURE 103 (1960).
6. GALILEO GALILEI, II SAGGIATORE, as quoted in ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE
SLEEPWALKERS 469 (1959).
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"inside" and an "outside." It was this growing awareness of the
apparent separation between the "me" and the "it" that, I believe, gave
rise to modem human self-consciousness. But it also gave rise to a world
of objects and events whose existence was independent of any observer
and whose behavior was governed by universal laws.
That view is so familiar to us today that we cannot see it as a
way of looking. We see it simply as the way things are. This illustrates
what I call the Second Corollary of Environmental Perception, which
states, "We tend to remain unconscious of those elements in our
environment for which there are no exceptions."
Perhaps it might be appropriate here for me to apologize for
spending so much time with Galileo. He is referred to so frequently,
however, as representing the beginning of the Scientific Revolution that I
thought it might be valuable to provide a slightly different context for
that statement than is usually done. In the end I trust it won't seem time
poorly spent.
The French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes was
46 years old when Galileo died. He had been much influenced by
Galileo's thinking and equally so by that of the English philosopherstatesman Francis Bacon. Bacon's ideas about a nature that was governed
by discoverable laws, coupled with Galieo's conviction that the language
of those laws was mathematical, led Descartes to imagine a utopian
world in which a universal science based on mathematics would lead to
human happiness through the control of nature. But it was not until the
end of the seventeenth century that the giant mind of Sir Isaac Newton
brought all these ideas together. In 1687 he published his great work the
7
"Principia."
Building on Galileo's work on the trajectory of cannon balls and
the acceleration of falling objects, and building, too, on the work of
Johannes Kepler, who believed that magnetism might explain how
planets moved in orbit around the sun, Newton created a new synthesis
with his idea of a law of universal gravity. His was uniquely a
mathematical description-one that could predict the flight of cannon
balls, the behavior of falling stones, or the orbit of the moon around the
earth.
We have forgotten how difficult it was for Newton to accept the
idea of gravity -to accept the existence of an invisible but measurable
force that acted everywhere across empty space. Writing to his English
friend Bentley after the "Principia" was published, he said,

7. Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis [The Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy 1][hereinafter Principia].
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That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to
matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance
through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything
else.. .is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man
who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of
thinking can ever fall into it.8
So Newton was never certain about the nature of gravity. On the
one hand in describing it as a purely physical force he explained that it
traveled through space by means of an invisible substance called the
ether that propagated gravity much as air propagates sound. On the
other hand, he believed that gravity might be a measurable yet
unexplainable expression of God's power. In the notes at the very end of
the "Principia," in acknowledging that his work left many things
unanswered, he concludes, "the supremely elegant structure of the solar
system cannot have arisen except through the device and power of an
intelligent being." 9 This sounds remarkably like an echo of something
said more recently by Professor Kenyon of San Francisco State
University.
That change in the perception of nature that we call the Scientific
Revolution was characterized by the slow but inexorable disappearance
from the universe of both "being" and "purpose." In Galileo, Descartes,
and especially in Newton, there can still be found on examination what I
would describe as a "residual of divinity." But what was remembered by
later scientists about Newton, for example, was not his belief that gravity
was a manifestation of God's mind. What was remembered was
Newton's mathematics and the predictability they offered when applied
to the motions of bodies in space. The idea of a divine mind, if there was
any longer a need for one, was relegated to the original act of creation.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the universe itself had become a
great machine governed by knowable laws.
So far in this discussion we have focused on some of the people
and events that led gradually to what might be called the
"objectification" of nature and to a view of the universe as a machine
governed by physical laws. What we have not traced over time is the
evolution of this same kind of thinking as applied to the world of living
organisms. If there were time for a discussion of this process, we
certainly would have to include the work of the early English naturalist
John Ray, a contemporary of Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and Newton,
whose interest in classifying living plants and animals gave modern
8.
9.

Principia,quoted in ARTHUR KOESTLER,

THE SLEEPWALKERS 503 (1959).
Principia,quoted in R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF NATURE 108-09 (1960).
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meaning to the word "species." We would have to include, as well, that
most prominent of classifiers, Linnaeus, and the early French
evolutionists Charles Bonnet and a bit later John Baptiste Robinet. Also
from France would come the remarkable work of the Comte de Buffon,
whose 44 volume Histoire Naturelle stands as a synthesis of living nature
that is to the eighteenth century what Newton's "Principia" was to the
seventeenth.
In the early eighteen hundreds there would be Georges Cuvier
and Lamarck. The former, whose theory of life-shaping catastrophes,
and the latter, whose theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics,
would each represent, as did all those who went before them, but one
more form in the evolution of the idea of evolution. The word
"evolution" is, for most of us, synonymous with the name of Charles
Darwin-so much so that some people believe that evolution is
something that Darwin himself "discovered." But Darwin's great
contribution was to define the process through which evolution
expressed itself in nature. He called it natural selection.
Today we encounter the idea of evolution almost everywhere in a book title on the "evolution" of economic theory, on a radio program
on the "evolution" of rock music, or in a lecture about the "evolution" of
jet aircraft. "Evolution" has thus become a metaphor for changes of all
kinds, most of which have no relation to biological evolution
whatsoever. In fact, the metaphor of evolution so permeates the fabric of
our thinking that it is hard for us to imagine that for centuries no such
concept existed. Another way of expressing this would be to say that
until humans could conceive of the idea of evolution there could be no
"discovery" of the process of evolution in nature. The idea had to be
present in the human mind before the world could be seen in that way.
Quite clearly, I think this suggests that as the mind itself evolves so
nature, too, is changed. The difficulty we have in being aware of this
process is revealed by what I call the Third Corollary of Environmental
Perception. It states that "we must first know that something is before we
can discover what something is."
The Origin of Species was first published in November of 1859. In
his book Darwin described a random and mindless process of natural
selection that over hundreds of millions of years had given rise to the
multiplicity of forms of life both past and present. It was a perception
that saw nature as a collection of discrete objects whose form and
function were governed by predictable laws that could be discovered by
the human mind. It was a perception that intensified the polarization of
the world into the observer and the observed.
It is important to note in this context that, while the nineteenth
century represented the culmination of this perception of nature as
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object, it was also the time of that pioneering work by Wilhelm Wundt in
Germany, and later by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung in the exploration
of that vast interior universe we call the mind. Thus, Darwin and Freud
might be said to represent the polarities of the objective and subjective
view of the world. With them the separation between the "outside" of
nature and the "inside" of nature was complete.
Then Darwin's contemporary, Alfred Russel Wallace, whose
work in Brazil and the East Indies led him to conclusions about evolution
that were similar to those published by Darwin, made a comment that
throws an entirely different light on these matters. In his book Man's
Place in the Universe, published in 1903, Wallace stated, "The marvelous
collection of forces which appear to control matter, if not actually to
constitute it, are and must be mind products." 10
Now we are venturing here on to very thin ice. It is difficult to
determine what Wallace meant by the word "mind." There is no
evidence, however, that we must assume he was speaking of that
"residual divinity" to which I referred in relation to the thinking of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What Wallace's statement does
offer to us is the opportunity to reexamine what we mean by the word
"mind."
So let me very briefly pose a kind of thought experiment.
If we were to take a walk in the woods, we might find ourselves
crossing a narrow stream, and there we notice that some ten or twelve
small stones have been removed from the stream and laid by the side of
the path in the shape of an arrow. Clearly someone has done this, and so
we feel no hesitation in arguing that the arrow is a manifestation of
mind. It would never occur to us to take a geologist's hammer and begin
breaking open the stones in search of the mind inside. It is not the
individual stones or something in them that reveals the presence of
mind. We would say it was their pattern. But then if we looked to either
side of the stone arrow we might see a tree. We would be able to identify
it, too, by its pattern of bark, its leaf shape, and even its overall outline as
a maple tree. But it would never occur to us to suggest that its pattern
was a manifestation of mind. We would say it was an object.
For us mind is assumed to be something contained in our heads.
And while we would perhaps agree that our heads and our bodies are
objects like the tree, we would insist there is something more inside us
that is not just object. So strong is this conviction that we resent it when
hospitals, corporations, or governments treat us as if we were only

10. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE (1903), quoted in STEPHEN
J. GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 397 (1985).
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objects. We insist that we be treated as people -that unique combination
of object and mind. But it never occurs to us to attribute this same dual
nature to nature herself. For us nature is only object, whether the nature
to which we refer is maple tree, atom, or galaxy.
There are two unquestioned assumptions on which we base this
belief. The first is that mind, our mind, evolved over millions of years
out of mindless matter. And the second assumption is that mind is
limited to humans and a few of the higher animals. All around us we see
countless physical objects that are manifestations of mind -computers,
screwdrivers, books, houses, cars, television sets, and scud missiles. And
while our senses perceive them as objects separate and distinct from us,
we can perhaps understand, when we stop to think about it, that they
came into existence only through mind-our mind. But we find it almost
impossible to entertain the idea that the maple tree by the path, or the
frog in the stream, or even we ourselves are products of mind. These, we
say, are the result of mindless evolution, shaped by a randomly
operating process we call natural selection. And when we say this we
forget that the concept of evolution itself is a product of mind -a way of
thinking that must precede our capacity to see nature in that particular
way. And to further confound our certainty about what is object and
what is mind, of what is outside us and what is inside, today we are told
by the particle physicists that the ultimate constituents of all matter
appear not as objects but as energy fields-states of being that under
some conditions have no mass and cannot be said even to occupy
particular space.
I am reminded of a comment made earlier this century by Sir
James Jeans, the respected physicist, astronomer, and mathematician.
"Today," he said, "there is wide agreement...that the stream of
knowledge is heading toward a non-mechanical reality; the universe," he
concluded, "begins to look more like a great thought than like a great
machine."" Here Jeans, like Alfred Russel Wallace, is once again
introducing the idea of mind -not necessarily in the form of a "residual
divinity," but certainly as some kind of force within nature and perhaps
not limited just to the human mind alone. In recognizing the importance
of the human mind in interpreting nature he had once said, "The
concepts which now prove to be fundamental to our understanding of
nature.. .seem to my mind to be structures of pure thought. " 12 Jeans died
in 1946 and he was only one amongst many twentieth century scientists
11. JAMES JEANS, THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE 137 (1937), quoted in ARTHUR
KOESTLER, THE SLEEPWALKERS 531 (1959).
12. JAMES JEANS, THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE 166 (1948), quoted in ROBERT G. JAHN

&
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206 (1987).
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who began to raise questions about the role of the observer's mind in
determining the outcome of observations.
Werner Heisenberg, a contemporary of Jeans, and one of the
founding fathers of wave mechanics and quantum theory, once
commented, "What we observe is not nature itself but nature exposed to
our particular form of questioning." 13 And Albert Einstein himself spoke
of the influence that theory had on observations. He said, "The sense
experiences are the given subject matter, but the theory that shall
interpret them is man made.. .it is the theory that decides what we can
observe." 14 Einstein went on to offer a caution: "Concepts that have
proved to be useful in ordering things easily acquire such authority over
us that we forget their human origin and accept them as invariable." 15 I
would add here that it is precisely such authority that has been assumed
by a mechanistic theory of evolution.
Now let me take the final step that will set us on the journey
back to where we started. In 1987, a remarkable but virtually unknown
book was published by Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovitch entitled The
Margins of Reality. It was subtitled "The Role of Consciousness in the
Physical World." Its authors were Drs. Robert Jahn and Brenda Dunne.
Jahn is a professor of Aerospace Sciences and Dean Emeritus of the
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at Princeton University.
Brenda Dunne is the manager of the Princeton Engineering Anomalies
Research Laboratory. Their academic credentials are impeccable.
For nearly two decades Jahn and Dunne have been studying the
impact of the human mind on mechanical and electrical systems. Their
work grew out of a concern of one of Jahn's graduate students that, as
micro-electronic circuits become increasingly smaller and more delicate,
humans working with instruments in which such circuits are a
component might possibly influence the functioning of those circuits by
their own thought processes. Obviously such influence could have
important implications in the use of computers, air traffic control
systems, and missile guidance devices.
Part of their carefully controlled and thoroughly documented
work involved the construction of a testing device called a Random
Event Generator. The following description of such a device is taken

13. WERNER HEISENBERG, PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY 42 (1958), quoted in GARY
ZUKAV, THE DANCING Wu LI MASTERS 114 (1979).

14. Jonathan F. Lewis, Theory Building in Sociology: Queen Anne and the Dinosaurs
(quoting Albert Einstein), in TEACHING CRITICAL THINKING 89 (John H. Clarke &
Arthur W. Biddle eds., 1993).
15. ALBERT EINSTEIN: PHILOSOPHER SCIENTIST (P.A. Schlipp ed., 1970), quoted in
R.G. JAHN & BRENDA J. DUNNE, THE MARGINS OF REALITY 207 (1987).
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from a paper by Jahn and Dunne entitled "Consciousness
Anomalous Physical Phenomena":

and

This REG [Random Event Generator] utilizes as its source a
commercial electronic noise diode whose output is
rendered by appropriate circuitry into a string of randomly
alternating binary pulses. A typical experimental trial
consists of 200 of these pulses, produced at the rate of 1000
per second and displayed to the operator as the number
conforming to a regularly alternating +, -, +, -, ... sequence,
where the theoretical expectation for the mean of any given
trial is 100 with a standard deviation of 7.07. (In essence,
the process is akin to flipping 200 coins very rapidly and
counting the number that conform to an alternating
16
sequence of heads and tails.)
To describe the process in simplified form, an operator attempts by his or
her thought to bias the output of the generator by increasing the number
of pluses or minuses beyond statistical expectation.
The results of literally millions of tests involving many different
participants over some seventeen years reveal that the mind can, indeed,
measurably influence the generator's output. And whether that mind is
in the same room as the Random Event Generator or whether it is
thousands of miles away seems to make no difference to the effect. Now
there is neither time nor is it appropriate here to detail the rigorous
protocols and the diversity of phenomena tested at Princeton involving
literally millions of test results all of which have been logged onto
computer. But the implications of this fascinating work ramify into every
area of scientific research. Toward the end of their book, Jahn and Dunne
consider some of the potential areas for exploration. They write,
The possibility that consciousness, through intention, can
marginally influence its physical reality to a degree
dependent on its subjective resonance with the system or
process in question has implications that could extend well
beyond those portions of engineering science, parapsychology, statistics, and quantum mechanics directly
involved in this research, into the life sciences, the social
sciences, and the humanities as well. For example, if we
look past the technological provinces of microelectronics,
artificial intelligence, and information processing, the next
16. Robert Jahn & Brenda Dunne, Consciousnessand Anomalous Physical Phenomena
5 (Princeton University, PEAR Note 95004) (May 1995).
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evident domain for further assessment of this influence
would be that of the living organism. In principle, much of
the experimental and theoretical methodology described in
[this book] could be directly applied to simple biological
systems and processes, particularly those appearing to rely
on some form of probabilistic behavior, such as bacteria,
algae, or sperm. While only a few basic experiments of this
class have been performed and the data are yet too sparse
to justify generic claims, evidence has indeed been
accumulating to indicate that quite similar marginal biases
of behavior can be effected in living systems as well.
If consciousness effects in this domain can be more fully
established, the implications and applications could range
from molecular biology and genetic chemistry on one
extreme, to general evolutionary theory on the other. The
possibility that cell biology might entail a volitional or
teleological component beyond random adaptation would
constitute a major branch point in the comprehension and
representation of the organizational capability of motiva17
tional factors in their assessment.
Now the possibility that the human mind could affect the behavior of
living organisms even at the smallest scale would require a rethinking
not only of the meaning of mind but of the processes of evolution itself.
It would introduce once again the whole difficult question of meaning
and purpose in nature.
In numerous conversations with Brenda Dunne about ongoing
research in the lab at Princeton, I have also enquired about whether she
knew of particular experiments dealing with the influence of mind on
living organisms. One paper she sent that I found of particular interest
was not produced at Princeton. Written in 1991 and sent to Dr. Dunne, it
was entitled "Consciousness Interactions with Remote Biological
Systems," co-authored by William G. Braud of the Psychology
Laboratory at the Mind Science Foundation in San Antonio, Texas, and
by his assistant Marilyn J. Schlitz. The paper details the experimental
protocols and the results of their work in measuring remote mental
influence on the blood pressure of other individuals, on the spatial
orientation of schools of fish in distant aquaria, on locomotor activities of
small mammals, and on the breakdown rate of human red blood cells in

17.
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solutions of varying salinity. Toward the conclusion of their paper Braud
and Schlitz comment,
In the English language literature alone there are approximately 100 published reports of experiments in which
persons have been able to influence mentally, and at a
distance, a variety of biological target systems including
bacteria, yeast colonies, motile algae, plants, protozoa,
larvae, woodlice, ants, chicks, mice, rats, gerbils, cats, and
dogs, as well as cellular preparations [blood cells, neurons,
cancer cells] and enzyme activity. 18
Brenda Dunne did not comment on Braud's paper when she sent
it to me, and, although I do not feel qualified to evaluate the work
scientifically, I can say from reading it that the results produced indicate
a measurable function of mind that lies outside our customary understanding of both mind and matter. Among the many interesting issues
raised in this paper, one of the most remarkable is that Braud believes
that he and other investigators have found a direct correlation between
measured fluctuations in the susceptibility of living organisms to mental
influence and variations in the activity of the earth's magnetic field.
Certainly there are questions in all of this that are worthy of
serious consideration by mainstream Western science. The central
unanswered issues, of course, involve an explanation of the relation
between mind and matter and of the nature of mind itself.
Sir James Jeans, who was quoted earlier, spoke of the effort to
discover the ultimate microphysical constituents of matter and said that,
as we do this, "the universe itself looks more like a great thought than
like a great machine." He recognized on this scale of investigation the
similarity between mind and matter. In continuing that same quote, he
said, "Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the
realms of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to
hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter." 19
Perhaps it was "mind" in this sense to which Alfred Russel
Wallace referred when, as I quoted him earlier, he said, "The marvelous
collection of forces which appear to control matter, if not actually to
constitute it, are and must be products of mind." 20 I think it may be
18. William G. Braud & Marilyn J. Schlitz, Consciousness Interactions with Remote
Biological Systems: Anomalous Intentionality Effects, 2 SUBTLE ENERGIES J. 35 (1991).
19. JAMES JEANS, THE MYSTERIOUS UNIVERSE 137 (1937), quoted in ARTHUR KOESTLER
THE SLEEPWALKERS 531 (1959).
20. ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE, MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE (1903),

GOULD, THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE 397 (1985).
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possible to imagine that in time we might come to accept that the human
mind can have some kind of influence on matter. But a much harder leap
for us would be to conceive of mind as existing anywhere but in human
heads. I would suggest, however, that this difficulty is a relatively recent
habit of our own thinking. Let me explain what I mean.
Some 400 hundred years ago, when Ptolemy's earth-centered
universe still formed part of what Western people took for granted about
their world, the idea of gravity was limited to the earth. When a stone
was thrown into the air and returned to earth, it did so because earth
was where stones "belonged." The earth occupied the center of the
cosmos and, at the same time, was also the lowest point in the cosmos,
and this created for people on earth what one writer has described as a
"vertiginous" universe. Everything else was "up" from earth, and earth
itself was "down" from everywhere. We can recreate a bit of that feeling
today by standing on a hillside on a starry night and looking up at the
sky. But back then, everything from flying cannon balls, to falling rain
proceeded like homing pigeons to where they naturally belonged. That is
what the word gravity meant, and it was easier to feel its meaning than to
think it. But in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as
Newton's idea of universal gravity began to spread, people's entire
feeling for the cosmos was forced to change. Gravity no longer had any
locus; it was everywhere.
Over time people became accustomed to thinking of the universe
in the new way. We no longer even question it today, because such
thinking is now habitual. Universal gravity is part of the "wallpaper" in
the house of our mind. In writing of this interesting transition of
perspective from earth-centered gravity to universal gravity, the English
philosopher Owen Barfield describes how, just as people in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries found it initially difficult to adjust
to the idea of universal gravity, they, in turn, took for granted something
that we find it almost impossible to comprehend. Barfield explains:
if we really want to put ourselves in their shoes, back at
that stage in the history of thought, we must practice
thinking, not only about such a thing as gravitation, which
is, easy for us, but rather about something which is
correspondingly difficult. Only in that way can we hope to
understand their difficulty in thinking about gravitation at
all. To think of gravity, or terrestrial physics of any sort, as
extending beyond the orbit of the moon was difficult for
them in the same way that it is difficult for us to think of
mind, or mental activity, or intelligence of any sort outside
of some particular physical brain. Contrariwise, this [which
is so difficult for us] was something that caused them no
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difficulty at all.. .whereas for us the very same words mean
the opposite thing-the word "thought", for instance,
means, for most people, something rather like cigarettes
inside a cigarette box called the brain. One good reason for
troubling to concentrate on the moment of change of
meaning is that it directs our attention...to fundamental
assumptions so deeply held that no one even thinks of
making them explicit. Try thinking and speaking about
"thought" or "thoughts" in the old way, if you want to
experience how difficult it must have been, before the
scientific revolution, to think about physics in the new
21
way.
I said at the beginning that I believe we are at the threshold of a
revolution in thought. It is already being reflected in the limited but
serious research efforts by a small segment of the scientific community to
assess the role of mind in influencing matter. I believe the results of that
investigation might well lead to the establishment of "mind" as a
universal and invisible force as significant to our understanding of the
structure of the universe as was the concept of a universal and invisible
force called gravity. I also believe that, in the context of this
investigation, universal mind, of which our own minds may well turn
out to be part, will be seen to be completely within the realm of what we
call nature, and that there will be nothing about it that is mystical,
religious, or supernatural.
And who knows? Some day, Professor Kenyon of San Francisco
State University, whose story began this journey over a decade ago, may
be back in the classroom teaching his students a very different way of
looking at evolution.

21.
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